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, I 
What Use is a Database 
of Demining Accidents? 
The author has maintained a database of demining accidents for four years. 
It contains records of many of the explosive accidents that deminers suffer 
while going about their work. This article explains the uses and limitations 
of the database and the software developed to contain it. 
by Andy Smith, AVS Mine 
Action Consultants 
l 11 rst published a dambase of accidents 
1n humanitarian demining (HD) in 
1998. In my experience, it was unique 
because it attempted ro contain the source 
material as well as the conventional "spread-
sheer" style summaries that characterise 
most dambases. 
There have been several releases on 
CD since 1998, and the latest was re-
cently completed with backing from the 
Geneva International Center for Hu-
manitarian D emining (GICHD). lr was 
origina lly cal led the " Database of 
Demining Incident Victims" (DDIV). At 
G ICHD's request, the latest version has 
been renamed the "Database ofDemining 
AccidentS" (DDAS). 
Original accident reportS (edited for 
anonymity) are included when possible. 
These may include photographs and usu-
ally include some medical derails about 
the victim's injuries and treatment. 
The 1999 edition of th e DDIV 
comained demil s of3 19 victims. The cur-
rent release contains an additional 160 
bur also many extensions to old entries, 
such as medical reports and interviews 
concerning the ongoing situation of vic-
rims. Some of the additional data records 
accidents that happened some rime ago. 
For example, there is now some dam about 
accidents in the British sector of Kuwai t 
after the Gulf War (none for other sectors). 
Principal Uses 
It has been argued that the database 
provides a stick with which to bear the 
HD industry. While it could not be used 
to target an individual or demin ing 
group, it could be used to criticise, bur 
only if you subscribe ro the belief that 
people on ly learn through pain. It is 
perfectly possible to use the lessons 
that can be derived in a positive way, 
as described below. 
By providing "snapshots" of 
activities surrounding accidents, 
the database can be used as an 
introduction ro how demining 
is actually carried our. This is 
often at variance with pub-
lished st andard operatin g 
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procedures (SOPs), and recent records are 
frequently very well detailed. Researchers 
developing new equipmem have used it, 
and I recommend irs use when preparing 
Technical Advisors (TAs) for field deploy-
ment. This might be especially useful when 
a TA has experience in one area and is be-
ing sent to another. 
Apart from my own papers, research 
papers based o n rhe database have been 
presented by Colonel Alistair McAslan 
(ex-GICHD, now Director, C ranfield 
Mine Action) and Dr. Vernon Joynt (ex-
MECHEM, now CSIR in South Africa). 
Training Aid 
As a training aid, real events can be 
used to show the importance of a whole 
range of demining rules. These include 
using adequate area marking, appropri-
ate tools and detectors, cautious excavation, 
Quali ty Control checks, blast visors, etc. 
It also provides salutary lessons on the 
need for good training, appropriate field 
control , open management, appropriate 
medical and communications equipment, 
etc. With real examples, these issues cease 
to be entirely a "matter of opinion. " 
Several demining non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) have asked for 
the med ical details in the database for use 
when training their field medics. 
Reference 
The dam base proved invaluable during 
the revision of some parts of the Interna-
tional Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
because the range of opinion was very 
broad and based on heartfelt individual 
experience. The abili ty to refer to a broad 
overview derived from global experience was 
useful, especially when the protagonists 
held positions of authority and had 
made previous decisions based on incom-
plete knowledge. 
In rhis context, reference to rhe da-
tabase established the prevalence of severe 
hand injury and showed which mines and 
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demining activities posed rhe greatest 
rhrear. lr also showed rhar over-protection 
with ineffec ti ve personal protective 
equipment (PPE) extras was neither de-
sirable nor necessary. 
Demythofogising 
Demining engenders myths of danger, 
heroism and the "black art." The database 
explodes many of rhe myrhs-and shows 
how si mple demining actually is. It also 
shows how multilayered management 
remote from the actual work can in rroduce 
new dangers by imposing their ignorance. 
T he most obvious myth rhar rhe da-
tabase exposes is rhar dem iners lie prone 
when excavating mines. Even in rhe few 
places where rhe SOPs demand it, lyi ng 
prone is so rare rhar ir is certainly rhe ex-
ception rather than rhe rule. 
IdentifYing Causes 
Perhaps mosr significant, the evi-
dence clearly indicates rhar deminer error 
is an infrequent cause of an accident and 
rhar fai lu res in the control chain are far 
more common. When seeking ro reduce 
the number of accidents and/or the sever-
ity of resulting injury, understanding why 
accidents occur is essential. When the person 
studying the dam base is a contributory cause, 
tharcan be a deeply uncomfortable lesson. 
Archive 
It is never possible to know what 
information will be needed in the fu ture. 
The database provides an archive ro en-
sure that dam is preserved. With the closure 
of the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination 
Cemre (MACC), the lessons derived 
from their accident investigat ions would 
be very hard ro access if they were not 
included in the DDAS. AJso, a dataset of 
accidents in Mozambique was recently 
retu rned to the Mine Action Cenrre 
(MAC) in Mozambique, where rhe origi-
nal records had been losr. And in Cambodia, 
most of the records that have survived are 
held in Khmer, so the DDAS p rovides 
an English language translation for those 
wanting to learn from past accidents. 
T he database is a useful source of 
information for managers and a very rei evant 
training rool for field use. Examples can 
be found to support safety requirements 
that deminers may thin k unnecessary, and 
the reports themselves can be used ro 
promote best practice in accident inves-
tigations. T he standard of investigation 
varies as much as the experience of those 
carrying them our, and frequently, an 
opportun ity to learn from mistakes can be 
obscured or lost in the reporting procedure. 
cceptance and eJectio 
While de mining NGOs such as 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and People 
Against Landmines (MgM) requested 
copies very early on and have issued the 
database ro field groups as a resource, 
other equally famous groups have fai led 
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An incident report inside the database. 
to cooperate with data acquisition and 
refused ro accept the most compelling in-
ferences rhar can be drawn from the data 
amassed abou t their own accidents. 
Because some players in the indus-
try have been less than honest in their 
reporting and less than open in sharing 
their experience, the DDAS cannot be 
presented as "comp lete." J think that there 
are about 65 percent of the accidents since 
1996 in rhe database, bur I cannot be 
sure. With records of close to 500 vic-
tims, it includes complete data for some 
countries in some years; Mozambique, 
Kosovo, Bosnia, Angola, Cambodia and 
Afghanistan are examples. The data made 
avai lable for Kurd ish Iraq is sporadic and 
censored by the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) before being 
supplied. Data from the Kuwait clean-up 
after the Gulf War is only just becoming 
available so the data sometimes stretches 
back in rime. l nreresringly, the patterns 
that emerge in countries where all data is 
available do not differ significantly from par-
terns based on incomplete data, so it 
seems that rhe inferences can be generally 
applied. Certainly, until a more complete 
dataset is compiled, there is no reason not 
to use the best evidence we have whi le 
working ro extend it. 
In some cases, co mmercial and 
political in terests have led to data being 
withheld. To eire a commercial example, 
it rook me more than four years to get 
copies of rhe wrirren reports surrounding 
accidents during the trials of a mechanical 
demin ingsystem in Mozambique. Those 
records include well-derailed charts of rhe 
staggering percentage of mines that were 
nor deronated and were left damaged by 
the machines, which may explain rhe pro-
tracted secrecy. 
An example of "political " interests 
leading ro secrecy is the fatal accident 
involving a roller system mounted on a 
tank outside Kabul in the early 1 990s. I 
presume that it is a fear of their own mis-
takes being made publ ic that has led rhe 
UK office of the famous NGO involved 
ro be uncooperative. T hey began by in-
sisting rhat they did not keep records of 
accidents. In 1997 , they corrected this 
and said that all their accident records 
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were hard to find. Two years later, they 
promised rhat data on all their accidents 
would be provided if! gave them the details 
about which of their accidents I already 
knew abour. I did that, but after a further 
18 months they have failed w provide 
access to records of a single accident. 
Fortunately, the field officers of that par-
ticular NGO are less fearful of rhe rrurh 
and (outside Afghanistan) have always pro-
vided all the records in their possession 
when I have gone to knock on their doors. 
It is only fair ro contrast the failures 
with the successes. Some MACs and 
NGOs have made their incident investi-
gations readily available. The Kosovo 
MACC was especially helpful. It made 
the most thorough investigations on 
record, provided them quickly and then 
carried out follow-up inquiries about the 
health of the victims. 
So, if the DDAS is less than perfect 
because it does nor contain all of the 
records it could, that problem will only 
be addressed when some major players 
in the industry smarten up their act. 
New Data, New 
Conclusions? 
I have previously published papers 
on my conclusions about accidenrs and 
their causes. The James Madison Univer-
sity (JMU) Journal of Mine Action, Issue 
4.2, Summer 2000, carries an article en-
tided "The Facts on Protection Needs in 
Humanitarian Demining" which I rec-
ommend you read-http://maic.jmu.edu/ 
journal/index/pasr.htm. 
The increased number of database 
entries have very little effect on my previous 
conclusions. But the incompleteness of 
the data means that any statistical analy-
sis based on it must always be made with 
informed caution. 
Additional records change the ratio 
between UXO and mine accidents in H 0 
significantly. But that ratio was never rep-
resentative because traditional explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks are often 
carried out by serving military who do 
not carry out independent investigations 
and do not make their own accident 
records available. 
The rich data stream from the 
Balkans has changed the balance of 
"threat" mines in HD, but not significantly. 
Defining the "threat" mines as those most 
frequently involved in accidents, the cur-
rent list (April 2002) reads: 









This is interesting, bur not much 
help unless you put it alongside the results 
of those accidents. For example, the 
mines/devices involved in accidents 
where deaths occurred were: 
Deaths in demining accidents 
AP blast 22% 
AP B/frag 33% 
Fuze 0% 





The AP blast and AP bounding-frag-
mentation situation is reversed with many 
more deaths from bounding-fragmen ration 
mines than from AP blast mines. You should 
also notice that ordnance, which is only 
involved in two percent of all accidents, 
causes a significant proportion offatalities. 
These figures are also misleading-
because most of AP bounding fragmen-
tation mine incidents occur in rhe Balkans 
with a mine that is not a problem in most 
of the rest of the world (the PROM-I). 
Also, most ofrheAP blast mine incidents 
involve the PMN, which does not occur 
at all in recorded accidenrs in the Balkans. 
It should also be noted that the majority 
of the ordnance deaths occurred in Kuwait 
during the post-Gulf War clean up and 
before any international safety standards 
for HD existed. 
To make an analysis of injury sig-
nificanr, T have had to draw a distinction 
between "minor" injuries and "severe" inju-
ries. 1 define the difference as: 
Minor: a minor injury is one rhar 
does not require surgical intervention and 
does not result in long-term disability. 
Severe: a severe injury is one that 
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results in long-term disability or requires 
surgical inrervcntion. 
This is a fairly crude distinction, but 
I have found it useful. 
Not every accidenr involved a severe 
injury. Of those that did, the devices in-
volved were: 
Severe injuries in demining accidents 
AP blast 70% 
AP B/frag 14% 
Fuze 1% 





These include deaths-which I have 
assumed always involved severe injuries. 
So you can see that AP blast mines 
cause by far the most severe injuries. 
Whatwa.~ the victim doing at rhe rime? 

















The most common activity at the 
time of a blast mine accidenr is excavat-
ing a suspicious area. This may have been 
found using a metal detector or a dog, 
exposed by a machine or may have been 
a part of wide-area excavation-during 
which the whole surface of the soil is re-
moved in suspicious areas where other 
methods cannot be used. 
ln an excavation accident, the two 
most common severe injuries are ro the 
eyes and the hands/arms. The injuries 
may be the loss of an eye, a finger, a hand 
or an arm-or may be the loss of func-
tion in an eye, finger, hand or arm-so 
leading to permanent disabili ty. 
Common injuries when excavating AP 
blast mines 
(as a percent of all excavation accidents) 
Loss of eye or eyes 6.7% 
Severe eye 22.7% 
Amp fingers 11.5% 









ln about 30 percent of all excavation 
accidents with AP blast mines, a severe 
eye injury occurs. 
In about 42 percent of all excavation 
accidents with AP blast mines, a severe 
injury to a hand or arm occurs. 
Severe chest injury occurred in only 
3.5 percent of recorded excavation acci-
dents, and in more than half of those, the 
injury was caused by parts of the han drool. 
Severe chest inju ry is rare-surprisingly, 
this is true whether or not the victim was 
wearing body armour. Many deminers 
without body armour get away with deto-
Ilating an AP blast mine with no bodily 
injuries a tall. While I personally like to wear 
frontal body armour, the database does 
nm provide compelling evidence of its value 
in an AP mine blast. Blast visors in good 
condition and purpose-designed demining 
handtools, do make a noticeable difference. 
Causes of the injuries 
Severe eye injury results from: 
1) Issu ing inappropriate eye protection, 
such as the industrial safety spectacles 
that are still widely used 
2) Issuing visors that cannot be seen 
through 
2) Using visors that are not down at the 
time of detonation 
3) The use of old, UV-hardened visors 
that shatter on blast impact 
Severe hand and arm injury results from: 
1) Using a short tool (meaning that the 
hand is within 30cm of the mine) when 
it detonates 
2) Using an inappropriate digging 
method so that the hand is above the 
mine when it detonates 
3) Using a tool that shatters on 
detonation and the parts inflict other 
injuries 
Hand injury also results from dig-
ging incautiously or from devices that are 
.. Demining Accident Database 
particularly sensitive; if the device is an 
AP blast mine, however, the detonation 
docs not generally cause severe injury un-
less one or more of rhe above are also true. 
So perhaps you will understand why 
my own particular technology interests 
in demining have been visors, handtools, 
appropriate PPE and training. The data-
base has helped me to identifY rhe problems 
and sometimes to begin to answer them. 
e Future o ne Accident 
Database 
Until recently, the CD database was 
unsupported by any organisation or donor. 
My last update of the database was funded 
through GICHDwith UN MAS approval. 
It is available on request from GICHD 
as a self-installing CD for use on comput-
ers with Windows 95 (or later) and Office 
97 Professional (or late r). Please contact 
Paul Ellis at GICHD (p.ellis@gichd.ch) 
if you would like a copy. 
I believe that it should be extended 
with another dataset listing missed-m ine 
incidents where the device was "found " 
after clearance was finished. These events 
are sometimes investigated, bur the re-
ports arc often jealously guarded. Such a 
dataset would allow some objective com-
parison of the effectiveness of m ethods 
(and groups). The database could also be 
extended to include darasets of civilian 
injury in uncleared areas-and you will 
find an example of this on the distribu-
tion CD. 
But, ar the rime of writing, rhe fu-
ture of the database is uncerta in. The 
database may be taken over by UN MAS/ 
GICHD who would then manage its 
maintenance and re lease. This should 
mean that access ro some data will be 
eas ier, but experience has shown me rhar 
only the groups with the authority to 
oblige reluctant dcmining groups and 
MACs to allow access to this data are their 
funders. I hope they can also be persuaded 
to cooperate. 
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!fUN MAS does rake over the data-
base, I will produce at least one further 
independenrupdare. 
Meantime, if you want to know how 
it really is or to base your training on re-
ality, please use it. lt costs nothing. 
And if you have derails of any 
demining accidenrs, please send rhem ro 
me at avs@landmines.demon.co.uk • 
To preserve the anonymity associated with the 
database, I cannot name the many people who have 
helped me to ger the data over the years. However, 
the management of a few dcmining organisations 
have been especially forthright and I do not think 
they would beoHended by a public acknowledgement 
of their organisations' honesty. These are: Mines Ad-
visory Group (MAG UK). the Kosovo MACC, 
(UN)ADP Mozambique , Danish Demining Group 
(DDG), Angolan National Institute for the Re-
moval of Explosive Obstacles (INAROEE) and Nor-
wegian Peop le's Aid (NPA) . Very many individuals 
working for other organisations have been a great 
help. They know who they are. and some are ac-
knowledged in rhc database imroduction. Thanks. 
Andy Smith has been a hands-on demining 
researcher for the past eight years. I lis work has 
rakcn him imo hundreds of mined areas in Angola, 
Mozambique, Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Afghanistan-also in Kosovo, Croatia and Hosnia 
Herzegovina. He has devised and implemenrcd 
equ ipment tests in several countries, developed new 
equipment and overseen irs technology rransfer ro 
developing countries, and been employed as a "sub-
jeer maucr specialist" by research programmes. Uni-
versities and many of the major players in HD. 
Recent work has included producing country spe -
cific training materials for de miners, surveyors and 
the general public. 
The parrofhis work that has raughr him most 
is the Database ofDeminingAccidcnts that he began 
back in I 998. This paper was an attempt ro answer 
the question "'What use does the database serve? '" 
*A{/ photos courtesy of the author. 
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